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PRISCILLA RUTH MACDOUGALL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
346 KENT LANE 
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53713 OCT 111988 
608-255-2971 
608-274-6729 COURT OF APPEAL 
October 5, 1988 
o 
o 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
re: Kathleen Hamby and 
the State of Utah v. Gail 
Jacobson, No. 880026-A 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
To my letter dated October 4, 1988, should be added the 
portion of the transcript at A-9 in the Respondent's brief. At 
oral argument there was discussion of the posture of the positions 
in the lower court. 
"Mr. Taylor...his conduct is not such as would in any way be so 
unreasonable or outlandish that would require the Court in the 
interest of the children to take his name from them.11 
Enclosed are five copies of this letter which I, by this letter, 
certify that I am sending to all counsel in the case. 
Thank you again. 
Sincerely, 
Priscilla RutkMac#6ugall 
cc: Kathleen Hamby 
Corporon and Williams 
Ray Gamon 
Lynn Wardle 
Richard Taylor 

Lynn D. Wardle, Esq. ... 
1976 N. 85 W. Pll Ff"^ 
Orem, UT 84057 l |-*-L^ 
801/225-9430 OCT Ig 1988 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
23 0 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Re: Hamby v. Jacobson, No. 880026-A 
Dear Ms, Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure I submit the following supplemental authorities. 
1. Point Argued: The Record Shows That Counsel for Both 
Parties Stipulated to Proceed on Proffers of Evidence. 
"An informal conference was held in chambers between the Court 
and counsel during which counsel stipulated to make proffers on 
the record and submit memorandum in support of their respective 
positions as this matter is mainly a matter of law." Minute 
Entry, October 24, 1975 (R. 71). 
2. Point In Brief: (Respondents Brief at 12) Despite 
Appellant#s Attempts to Suggest Otherwise The Record Shows that 
Mr. Jacobson Is Current In His Child Support Payments. 
"MR. GAMMON: The mother has received some assistance from the 
State of Utah in the past. The defendant or father has paid that 
money to the State that was owing to the State. And so the State 
then is simply to state that we have been paid for all assistance 
that has been provided heretofore." Transcript of Trial, March 
14, 1985 (R. 149) 
3. Point in Argument: How Often Mr. Jacobson Has Visited His 
Children (Or Been Violently and Abusively Prevented From Doing So 
By Ms. Hamby) Since the Lower Court Entered Its Order. 
Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430, 431 (Utah 1970): "On appeal to 
this court we review the judgments and orders appealed from on 
the basis of the record upon which the trial court acted, and do 
not permit the supplementation of our record with matters not 
before the trial court." 
Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978): "However, 
those matters are not part of the record before us, and in accord 
with well-recognized rules of appellate review, we cannot 
consider them in connection with this appeal." 
October 10, 1988 
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Pvle v, McClure, 563 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1977): "Conceivably, it 
could have changed the result, but it is not part of the record, 
it was not submitted to the trial court, and we do not consider 
it here," 
See also Chapman v. Chapmap, 728 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 1986); 
Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 154 (1963). 
4. Point in Argument: Whether Remand for Further Proceedings 
Is Necessary. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(3): "The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, 
or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and 
necessary." 
Ruling, February 21, 1986: "Finally, the court notes that the law 
provides that the children may petition for a name change if they 
so desire when they are old enought to make an intelligent 
decisions." (R. 103) 
See also Hogue v. Hogue, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). 
5. Point Briefed: Utah Does Not Authorize Joint Custody 
(Petitionees Brief at 34) ; Point Argued: Utah Policy Re: Right 
of Noncustodial Father to Maintain Relationship With Child 
Following Divorce; This is a Type of Joint Custody. 
In 1988 the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Annotated § 3 0-3-
10.1 to -10.4f* (1988) to enact the following statutory joint 
custody preference: XEROXED COPY ATTACHED, 
Enclosed are five copies of this letter. I certify that I have 
mailed^a^copy of this letter to: Richard Taylor, Priscilla Ruth 
MacDougall, Corporon and Williams, and Ray Gammon. 
Lncere 
Lyrm D. Wardle 
Counsel for Respondent 

this chapter, "joint legal custody" 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, 
uties, and powers of a parent by both parents, 
rhere specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive author-
by by the court to one parent to make specific 
ecisions; 
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the 
hild except as specified in the order of joint legal 
ustody; 
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly 
qual periods of physical custody of and access to 
he child to each of the parents, as the best mter-
st of the child often requires that a primary 
ihysical residence for the child be designated; 
nd 
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying 
ne parent as the primary caretaker and one 
Lome as the primary residence of the child. 1988 
10.2. Joint legal custody order — Factors 
for court determination — Public as-
sistance. 
There is a rebuttable presumption, subject to 
action (2), that joint legal custody is in the best 
»st of a child. 
The court may order joint legal custody if it 
mines that: 
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal 
istody; 
(b) joint legal custody is in the best interest of 
le child; and 
(c) both parents appear capable of lmplement-
g joint legal custody 
[n determining the best interest of a child, the 
shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and 
notional needs and development of the child 
ill benefit from joint legal custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first pnor-
y to the welfare of the child and reach snared 
jcisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encour-
jmg and accepting a positive relationship be-
veen the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in rais-
ig the child before the filing of the suit; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of 
te parents; 
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, any 
•eference of the child for or against joint legal 
istody; and 
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
The determination of the best interest of the 
shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The court shall inform both parties tha t an or-
r joint custody may preclude eligibility for pub-
ustance m the form of aid to families with de-
nt children, and tha t if public assistance is re-
i for the support of children of the part ies a t any 
ubsequent to an order of joint legal custody, the 
may be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4 
The court may recommend tha t where possible 
urties a t tempt to settle future disputes by a dis-
esoiution method belore seeking enforcement or 
ication of the terms and conditions of the order 
it legal custody through litigation, except in 
ency situations requiring ex parte orders to 
t the child. 1988 
30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order. 
(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide 
terms the court determines appropnate, which may 
include specifying: 
(a) either the county of residence of the child, 
until altered by further order of the court, or the 
custodian who has the sole legal right to deter-
mine the residence of the child; 
(b) that the parents shall exchange informa-
tion concerning the health, education, and wel-
fare of the child, and where possible, confer be-
fore making decisions concerning any of these 
areas; 
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regard-
ing the child's present and future physical care, 
support, and education. 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the 
child's attendance at school and other activities, 
his daily routine, and his association with 
friends, and 
(e) as necessary the remaining parental rights, 
privileges, duties, ana powers to be exercised by 
the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly 
(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the 
order the terms agreed to between the parties 
(3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed 
by the court order may be exercised by the parent 
having physical custody of the child the majonty of 
the time. 
(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians 
does not impair or limit the authontv of the court 
to order support of the child, including payments 
by one custodian to the other 
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is 
not grounds for modifying a support order 
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute resolu-
tion procedure the par t ies agree to use before seeking 
enforcement or modification of t he te rms and condi-
t ions of the order of joint legal custody through litiga-
tion, except m emergency s i tuat ions r e q u m n g ex 
par te orders to protect the child. 1988 
30-3-10.4. Modif icat ion or terminat ion of order. 
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal 
custodians the court may, after a heanng, modify an 
order that established joint legal custody if: 
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or 
both custodians have materially and substan-
tially changed since the entry of the order to be 
modified, or the order has become unworkable or 
inappropriate under existing circumstances, and 
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions 
of the decree would be an improvement for and in 
the best interest of the child 
(2) (a) The order of joint legal custody is termi-
nated upon the filing of a motion for termination 
by 
(l) both parents; or 
(n) one parent, when notice of the motion 
is sent by certified mail to the other parent 
and an affidavit is filed with the motion, in-
dicating the motion has been mailed as re-
quired by this subsection 
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be re-
placed by the court with an order of sole legal 
custody unaer Section 30-3-10. All related issues, 
including visitation and child support, shall also 
be determined and ordered by the court 
(3) If the court finds that an action under this sec-
tion is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner 
designed to harass the other party, the court shall 
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending 
partv 1988 

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE COURT BELOW 
1. Kathleen Jacobson. The plaintiff who filed the Complaint 
seeking a divorce in the district court was Kathleen Jacobson. 
As a part of the relief granted by the district court, her 
surname was changed from Jacobson to Hamby. By stipulation of 
the parties the title of this case on appeal has been changed to 
reflect the fact that her surname now is Hamby. 
2. Gail Jacobson. The defendant below, Mr. Gail Jacobson, 
was the husband of Kathleen Jacobson until the court below 
granted the divorce decree sought by his wife. Mr. Jacobson is 
the father of two children by Kathleen, Kelly and Kevin. 
3. State of Utah by and through Utah State Department of 
Social Services. Because Kathleen and the children had received 
some assistance from the State of Utah for a period of time, the 
State was joined as a plaintiff in the divorce suit below. 
Because Mr. Jacobson had paid back the state for all the 
assistance by the time of the divorce hearing, the State did not 
seek, nor did the district court enter, any judgment against Mr. 
Jacobson. (R. 149, Tr. 29.) The State has no interest in this 
appeal, has not filed any notice of appeal, has not participated 
in the case on appeal, and is not a real party in the case the 
appeal. 
4. NB: Nonparties With Significant Interests. The two 
children of Ms. Hamby and Mr. Jacobson, Kelly and Kevin, were not 
formal parties to the proceedings below, nor was any guardian ad 
litem appointed to represent their interests. Kelly was 
approximately twenty-eight months old and Kevin was approximately 
six months old when the hearing on petitions for name change was 
held and the judgment was entered from which this appeal was 
taken. 
Mr. Hamby, the former spouse of Kathleen Hamby, may have some 
practical, if not legal, interest in whether two children which 
he did not father, which were born to his former wife several 
years after their divorce, are given the surname Hamby. He was 
not a party to the proceedings below. 
(2) 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court commit reversible error in 
applying the "best interests of the child" standard to determine 
what the legal surname of two infant children of divorcing 
parents should be after the parents' divorce, and in rejecting 
Appellant's claim that she, as the custodial parent, had the 
unilateral right to determine the surname of the two infant 
children of the parties? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in 
determining that it would be in the best interests of the two 
infant children of the parties to be known by the surname 
Jacobson after their parents' divorce when the mother was awarded 
custody of the children, the mother chose to be known after the 
divorce by the surname of another former husband, Mr. Hamby, who 
was the father of an older child in her custody who uses the 
surname Hamby, and she wanted the two children of Mr. Jacobson 
who would be in her custody also to be known by the surname 
Hamby, but Mr. Jacobson wanted his children to bear the Jacobson 
surname, he was awarded visitation rights and ordered to pay 
support, the parties previously had agreed to change the birth 
certificate of their oldest child, born out of wedlock, to 
Jacobson, and the district court found, inter alia, that the 
relationship between the noncustodial father and his children 
would be strengthened by the children bearing the name Jacobson, 
that the mother-child relationship would not be harmed if the 
children had that surname, and that that the children would not 
suffer embarrassment because of any alleged bad reputation 
associated with the surname of their father? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & REGULATIONS 
Constitutional Provision-United States 
Amendment XIV, section 1 
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Constitutional Provisions-Utah 
Article I, section 2 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
Article I, section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Statutes 
U.C.A. 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children-Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction—Custody and visitation-Termination of alimony. 
(Pre-1985 version): 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance and health care of 
the parties, as may be equitable. The court shall include in 
every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for 
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses of the dependent children. If coverage is available 
at a reasonable cost, the court may also include an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, 
hospital, and dental care insurance for those children. The 
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such 
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support 
and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support, maintenance, and health and dental care, 
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable 
and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents, 
and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare 
of the child. 
3 
(As amended in 1985.): 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance and health care of 
the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court 
shall include in every decree of divorce an order assigning 
responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children. If 
coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court may 
also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance 
of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for those children. The court shall have continuing 
jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to the support and maintenance, and health and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property as shall be 
reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives shall take into 
consideration the welfare of the child. 
U.C.A. 30-3-10. Custody of children. 
In any case of spearation of husband and wife having minor 
children, or whenever a marriage is declared void or 
dissolved the court shall make such order for the future care 
and custody of the minor children as it may deem just and 
proper. In determining custody, the court shall consider the 
best interests of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration 
the children's desires regarding the future custody; however, 
such expressed desires shall not be controlling and the court 
may, nevertheless, determine the children's custody 
otherwise. . . 
U.C.A. 42-1-1 to 3. Chapter 1. Change of Name. 
U.C.A. 42-1-1. By petition to district court-Contents. 
Any natural person, desiring to change his name, may file a 
petition therefor in the district court of the county where 
he resides, setting forth: 
1) The cause for which the change of name is sought. 
2) The name proposed. 
3) That he has been a bona fide resident of the county for 
the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition. 
42-1-2. Notice of hearing-Order of change. 
The court shall order shay, if any, notice shall be given of 
the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may 
order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open 
court of the allegations of the petition and that there 
exists proper cause for granting the same. 
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42-1-3. Effect of proceedings. 
Such proceedings shall in no manner affect any legal action 
or proceeding then pending, or any right, title or interest 
whatsoever. 
Rules and Regulations 
Guidelines for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child 
on the Birth Certificate (revised October 5, 1981) of the Bureau 
of Health Statistics, Utah Department of Health. 
Surname of Child. 
The surname to be given the child should be determined by the 
parents. 
A. When the mother is married it is usual for the child to 
receive the surname of the husband (father). However, some 
recent immigrants into the United States and some subcultures 
within the nation have customs of assigning surnames which 
vary from the standard American tradition. The surname given 
the child should be determined by both parents. It clearly 
is not mandatory that the child have the father's surname. 
When the parents disagree as to the child's surname, the sole 
consideration should be the best interests of the child. 
THis may be best determined by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
Therefore, if the parents (husband and wife) are in 
disagreement regarding the surname of the child, it should be 
left blank on the birth certificate. It can be added later 
when the parents reach agreement by an affidavit to amend a 
record or if necessary, by court order. 
B. When the child's mother is not married, she has 
considerable latitude in the name she gives the child. Even 
if the father is not named on the birth certificate, the 
mother may give the child a surname different than her own 
surname. Additionally, the mother may name the father on the 
birth certificate (by Acknowledgment of Paternity) and give 
the child a surname different than the father's. 
C. The parents should be advised that by giving the child a 
different surname than that of the father, the birth 
certificate may appear to some persons as a birth which 
occurred out of wedlock. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, and 
Disposition in the District Court, 
The proceeding below commenced on or about October 29, 1984, 
when Kathleen Jacobson (now known as Kathleen Hamby) filed a 
complaint and an amended complaint seeking a divorce from her 
husband, Gail Jacobson. (R. 4 & 7.) The parties stipulated to 
all matters except one: they could not agree what surname their 
children (Kelly Lynn, who was born before they married, and Kevin 
D., who was en ventra sa mere and would be born two days after 
the divorce) would use after the divorce. (R. 31, 32 & 122-23, 
Tr. 2-3.) The matter came before Judge Bullock of the Fourth 
Judicial District for hearing on March 14, 1985. (R. 120.) 
Counsel for defendant moved for a continuance. (R. 123, Tr. 3.) 
Judge Bullock heard plaintiff's evidence (R. 125, Tr. 5), then 
granted the divorce according to the stipulation, ordered that 
Kelly would continue to have the surname Hamby "at this time" 
(R. 116), ordered that the unborn child would take the surname 
Jacobson when it was born, and ruled that the parties could apply 
for name changes after the unborn child had been born, that 
defendant could present evidence at that time, and the court 
"would preserve the issues with respect to both until that time." 
(R.149-52, Tr. 29-32.) 
A divorce decree was entered on or about April 11, 1985. (R. 
114.) 
After the birth of their second child, both parties filed 
petitions to have the court change the surnames of the children: 
the mother wanting them both to bear the "Hamby" surname, and the 
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father wanting them both to bear the "Jacobson" surname. (R. 37 
& 39. ) 
The matter was heard on October 24, 1985, before Judge 
Harding, to whom the case was assigned following the retirement 
of Judge Bullock. Counsel for both parties made proffers of 
evidence. (R. , 2d Tr. 1-8.) After the parties submitted 
memoranda on the legal issue, the district court entered its 
Ruling noting many factors which it was taking into account and 
finding "that it is in the best interest of the parties minor 
children, Kelly Lynn and Kevin D., to be known by the surname 
Jacobson." (R. 102.) An Order to that effect was entered March 
10, 1986. (R. 104.) 
On or about April 7, 1986, Ms. Hamby filed a Notice of Appeal 
from that Order. (R. 109.) 
B. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented 
for Review. 
The critical facts in this case are essentially undisputed. 
(R. 75, 102, Tr. 2, 6.) Mr. Gail Jacobson and Ms. Kathleen Hamby 
married each other on or about November 29, 1983. (R. 75.) Each 
had been married previously. Kathleen had been married to a Mr. 
Hamby, and had a child by him which she was raising. After her 
divorce from Mr. Hamby, Kathleen continued to be known by the 
surname Hamby. So did her child. 
1 The transcript of this hearing was inadvertently omitted by 
Appellant from the Record. Counsel for the parties have 
stipulated, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h) 
that it be included in the record and on the Index of Record. 
As yet that has not been accomplished. References to this 
short transcript are indicated herein by "R. , 2d Tr.#." A 
copy of this transcript is included in the Addendum. 
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After her divorce from Mr. Hamby, Ms, Hamby became pregnant 
with a child by Mr. Jacobson. The child was born on or about 
June 14, 1983 out of wedlock, and Ms. Hamby named him Kelly Lynn 
Hamby on his birth certificate. (R. 75-76.) ("He was born out 
of wedlock and I gave him the name that I carried then." R. 
127.) The parties agree that Gail Jacobson is the father of and 
has acknowledged paternity of Kelly Lynn Hamby. (R. 75-76, 139, 
, Tr. 19, 2dTr. 4.) 
Approximately five months after the birth of Kelly the 
parties married each other. (R. 75.) During their marriage, 
Kathleen assumed the Jacobson surname. (She sued for divorce as 
Kathleen Jacobson and testified that she wished to resume the use 
of the name Hamby, by which she had been known prior to the 
marriage to Mr. Jacobson. R. 5, 126, 127; see also Affidavit In 
Support of Motion for Change of Title of Action.) (Defendant's 
counsel proffered evidence that during their marriage the oldest 
child of the parties, Kelly, like his mother, also was known by 
the surname Jacobson, but this is disputed. R. , 2d Tr. 5). 
After their marriage, the parties agreed to change Kelly's 
surname to Jacobson, and Kathleen got the necessary forms and 
filled them out, leaving nothing to be done except to have them 
notarized. (R. 128, Tr. 8.) Ms. Hamby's counsel summarized it 
this way: "She would testify that some time after her marriage to 
Mr. Jacobson they did enter into an agreement to change the 
second child's name from Hamby to Jacobson, but that as far as I 
can ascertain that was never followed through with on the records 
of the State of Utah as far as an actual change being made in the 
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birth certificate." (R. , 2d Tr. 3,) Even though she was wary 
of her husband's motives for insisting on that Kelly bear his 
surname, she "still felt that for my child's sake it was the 
thing to do and I went ahead and signed them, but I didn't send 
them into the State because I was too confused as to whether I 
should give him that kind of a right to a child that he had been 
abusive towards ...." (R. 128, Tr. 8.) She agreed with her 
husband, Gail Jacobson, "to put his name on the birth certificate 
of the born child and have the unborn child when its born. . . . 
I feel that they should have their father's name on the birth 
certificate. That's for the children's sake." R. 132, Tr. 12.) 
During the marriage of the parties to each other, Kathleen 
became pregnant with their second child. She was pregnant when 
she filed her complaint for divorce, and was due to deliver in 
just four weeks when the divorce hearing was held on March 14, 
1985. (R. 132, Tr. 12.) 
By stipulation, the parties agreed that after the divorce, 
Kathleen could resume using the surname of her previous husband, 
Hamby. They agreed that she would have custody of the children, 
and that Mr. Jacobson would have reasonable visitation rights 
with his two children. (R. 32.) They also agreed that for the 
health of the mother the divorce should become final upon entry 
(R. 136, Tr. 16). The court granted the divorce as stipulated by 
the parties. (R. 149. Tr. 29; R. 114.) 
At the divorce hearing, the only dispute concerned the name 
by which the two children of the parties would be known after the 
divorce. Kathleen wanted the two children to be known after the 
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divorce by the name she had chosen for herself, Hamby (the name 
of her former husband); Mr. Jacobson wanted his children to be 
known by his surname, Jacobson. (R. 32.) Kathleen testified as 
to the reasons why she wanted their children to have the Hamby 
surname. She had custody of a ten year-old son from her former 
marriage, who had the surname Hamby. (R. 127, Tr„ 7.) She was 
concerned that: 
If the children donft have the same last name in the family I 
feel that it makes more insecurity, less family closeness. 
Mr. Jacobson has put me in a position now to raise three 
children by myself, because it's his choice not to be a 
husband I can stay with. And when I have to raise three 
children I need the best circumstances to raise those kids 
under that's possible; And I feel that having my whole family 
have the same last name brings the family closer together, 
there will be a lot less questions brought up at an earlier 
date for those little babies. They won't be wondering why 
their name is different until they are oldenough to discuss 
it. 
(R. 131, 32, T. 11, 12. Emphasis added.) She further testified 
(notwithstanding her stipulation regarding visitation) that she 
did not want Mr. Jacobson "to have any association with the child 
at all" after the divorce. (R. 140, Tr. 20.) She alleged that 
her husband "has always been known as a drinker and a fighter in 
town." (R. 133, Pr. 13.) And she indicated that she believed 
that she should have the right to choose the name of the children 
because "I have custody of them, and I'm their mother." (R. 141, 
Tr. 21.) But she agreed that "as the children get older, if they 
make the decision that they want their father's name, if he has 
been coming around and seeing them and being a father to them, I 
would never object to my children having their way when they are 
old enough to make a decision like that." (R. 140, 41, Tr. 20, 
21. ) 
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Mr. Jacobson was unavailable to testify at the divorce 
hearing because, as his attorney advised the court, he was an 
unemployed miner who recently had a chance to go out of state for 
a few days work. ("He's been unemployed all winter, and told me 
that if he passed this opportunity up he'd go to the bottom of 
the board, something to do with the union" R. 123-24, Tr. 3-4.) 
His attorney had requested that the hearing be continued. After 
allowing the plaintiff to present her evidence, the court entered 
an order essentially "preserv[ing] the issues with respect to 
both [children] until" after the birth of the second child, and 
allowing Mr. Jacobson to present testimony then. (R. 152, Tr. 
32.) Thus, the court ruled that the oldest child would bear the 
surname Hamby, and the next child should be named Jacobson, for 
the time being. 
At the divorce hearing Mr. Gammon, an attorney representing 
the State of Utah, appeared and advised the court that Mr. 
Jacobson had paid back the State all the money that was owing as 
a result of some assistance the State had provided Mrs. Jacobson 
in the past. (R. 149, Tr. 29.)2 
On April 13, 1985, two days after the Divorce Decree was 
entered, the second child of the parties was born. (R. 76, 77.) 
Pursuant to the Divorce Decree, the child was given the surname 
of Jacobson. (Ij3.) The full name of this child is Kevin D. 
Jacobson. (Id.) 
2 The implication in Appellant's Brief that Mr. Jacobson was 
garnished because he failed to pay child support is 
misleading. The garnishment was to collect the judgment of 
$252 for his ex-wife's attorney's fee. (R. 50, 115.) 
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The court bases this ruling on the following reasons: 1) the 
father-child relationship will be strengthened by the 
children bearing the name Jacobson while not harming the 
mother-child relationship, 2) there is no embarrassment [sic] 
or inconvenience associated with an explanation of why their 
mother's surname is different since divorce is a common 
occurrence, 3) the children are too young to be accustomed to 
the surname Hamby, 4) Hamby is not the mother's maiden name, 
5) there is no embarrassment because of defendant's alleged 
bad reputation, and 6) the children will always be identified 
with at least one natural, parent by being known as Jacobson. 
. . . Of paramount concern to the court is the fact that 
Kevin and Kelly should both bear the same name to avoid any 
implication of illegitimacy which might arise if asked why 
brothers of the same natural father have different last 
names. 
Finally, the court notes that the law provides that the 
children may petition for a name change if they so desire 
when they are old enough to make an intelligent decision. 
(Id.) On March 10, 1986, the district court entered its Order 
that the infant children of the parties, Kevin D. and Kelly, 
should both bear the surname Jacobson. (106.) 
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the two minor infants of the parties. The court properly 
resisted attempts by the appellant to decide the controversy from 
the perspective of the wishes or welfare of the contending 
adults. 
Procedurally, there is no question that the district court 
had jurisdiction, incidental to and in connection with the 
divorce of the parties, to resolve the dispute concerning the 
surname of thier infant children. At the divorce hearing, after 
Ms. Hamby's evidence was presented, the district court properly 
delayed ruling on the issue, giving the parties a chance to reach 
an agreement themselves, and reserving Mr. Jacobsonfs right later 
to introduce evidence. Later the court properly received 
proffers of evidence (by stipulation of the parties), and asked 
for memoranda on the legal issues. After receiving those 
memoranda, the district court entered a fair and just Order. 
Since the district court did not abuse its discretion or enter a 
flagrantly unjust order, the Supreme Court of Utah should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but should 
affirm the Order of the district court. 
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ARGUMENT 
What's in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet. 
Wi 11 iam Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, 1.1 I 1 1 
Good name ii l man and woman, dear my lord 
Is the immediate j ewe 1 o£ their sou1s ; 
W! u : • steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothi ng, 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that wh:i ch not enriches him, 
And makes me poor indeed, 
K i x ^ ^ . Shakespeare, Othello, III, i i 1, 155. 
I hate the man who builds his name 
On ruins of another's fame. 
John Gay, Fablels pt , I "I he poet and the rose," (\l/l) 
I. The District Court Applied the Proper Legal Standard to 
Resolve the Conflict Between the Divorcing Parties Concerning the 
Surname Their Children Should Have. 
A. A dispute between divorcing parents regarding the 
surname their children will have after the divorce should be 
resolved by the "best interests of the child" standard. 
This d. * ; : T i "v_ ,; * appliec the M be:.- : iv t e s t a f r, - "" 
standard z 
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 f t h e sci-? 
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consideration should be the best interests of the child. This 
may be best determined by a court of competent jurisdiction." 
Numerous statutes specify that Utah courts are to follow the 
"best interests of the child" standard in resolving conflicts 
regarding the welfare of minor children. See, e.g., U.C.A. § 30-
3-5 (in awarding visitation the court "shall take into 
consideration the welfare of the child"); U.C.A. § 30-3-10 (in 
determining custody and making related orders at the time of 
divorce "the court shall consider the best interests of the 
child"); U.C.A. § 78-3a-48 (juvenile court may approve voluntary 
termination of parental rights if "in the best interests of the 
parent and the child"); U.C.A. § 78-3a-39 (juvenile court may 
enter all reasonable orders concerning a child in its 
jurisdiction "which are for the best interests of the child"); 
U.C.A.§ 78-30-9 (adoption order will be granted only if the court 
is "satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by 
the adoption"); U.C.A. § 78-45c-3 (l)(b) & (d) ("best interests 
of the child" is one factor in determining whether court may 
exercise child custody jurisdiction); U.C.A. § 78-45c-7 (3) 
(court should not exercise custody jurisdiction "if it is in the 
interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction"). 
Likewise, numerous cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
unequivocally established "best interests of the child" as the 
legal standard for dissolving disputes regarding the custody and 
care of minor children. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Hutchison 649 
P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) "In a controversy over custody, the 
paramount consideration is the best interests of the 
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(1975) ("The persons who have the paramount interest are the 
children and their best interests are controlling."); In re 
Marriage of Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 169 Cal Rptr. 918, 620 
P.2d 579, 583 (1980) ("Henceforth, as in parental custody 
disputes, the sole consideration when parents contest a surname 
should be the child's best interests."); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 
N.W.2d 303, 305 (Minn. 1981) ("the best interest must govern the 
resolution of the parents' quarrel"); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 
298, 300 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982) ("the 
best interests of the child controlled the resolution of the 
issue"); Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089, 91 (Mont. 1983) ("the 
change of name and whether it was in the best interest of the 
child"); Firman v. Firman, 610 P.2d 178, 181 (Mont. 1980) ("Since 
there is no other statute in point, the Court must fall back on 
general principles, the most important of which in any proceeding 
concerning the relationship of a father and his child is the best 
interests of the child."); Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d 381, 384 
(Neb. 1982) ("the standard to be used in the accomplishment of 
this task is the best interests of the child, the same standard 
used in all cases involving custody and visitation of minor 
children"); Cohen v. Cunningham, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (App. Div. 
1984) ("neither parent has a superior right to determine the 
surname of the child, and the question always is whether the best 
interests of the child will be served by the change."); Hurta v. 
Hurta, 605 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Wash. App. 1979) ("there is nothing 
in the record to show that the proposal was considered from the 
standpoint of the child, and it is the 
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name by which a child will be known after divorce over the 
objection of the other parent. And despite enormous straining, 
she has been unable to cite any court anywhere which has adopted 
that position. The leading authority cited for her proposition 
is a concurring opinion of one justice stating what he thought 
the rule should be in a case in which the California Supreme 
Court expressly adopted another rule—the best interests of the 
child standard. In re Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583, 585 (majority 
rule and Justice Mosk's concurring opinion). The overwhelming 
weight of authority rejects the custodial parent rule. "Giving 
the choice [of surname for children] to the custodial parent has 
generally been rejected by the courts." Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 
at 328 n. 113. Counsel for Appellant has acknowledged that 
"Appellate courts have not expressly adopted the custodial parent 
presumption, and one court to which it has been argued has 
expressly rejected it." MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name 
Their Children, 3 J.L. & Ineq. 91, 150 (1985) (hereinafter cited 
as "MacDougall"). The Nebraska Supreme Court recently declare: 
"We refuse to suggest or hold that a presumption exists in favor 
of the custodial." Cohee, 317 N.W.2d at 384. (But the court did 
indicate that the name desired by the custodial parent was one 
factor that should be considered. Ijd. ) See also Young v. Young, 
356 N.W.2d 823 (Ct. App. Minn. 1984); In re Schidlmeier, 496 A.2d 
1249 (Pa. Super. 1985) (where the court "shied away from 
expressly articulating the presumption" even though Pennsylvania 
has an express regulation on the point. MacDougall, 3 J.L. & 
Ineq. at 151 n. 242.) Apparently legislatures in two states have 
adopted laws providing that the custodial parent has the right to 
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It would be very poor policy for this court to adopt the 
custodial parent rule or presumption urged by the Appellant. The 
rule would be contrary to the policy of this court against "fixed 
rigidities11 in matters regarding the welfare of children. 
Bingham v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1978). Moreover, the 
custodial parent rule or presumption would create a significant 
obstacle to parents voluntarily reaching agreements regarding 
custody of their children. Surely many parents who are willing 
to stipulate that their ex-spouses should have primary custody of 
their children would be reluctant to do so if the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that the custodial parent had the right, or 
presumptive right, to select the name by which the children would 
be known following the divorce. The whole notion of giving one 
parent the authority unilaterally to determine this matter is 
unwise and arbitrary. Indeed, if the court were to adopt an 
arbitrary, unilateral rule, the better rule would be that adopted 
by the majority of states which have adopted legislation on this 
subject, i.e., that the noncustodial parent who is fulfilling his 
responsibilities of support and association with the child ought 
to have the primary role in determining the name by which the 
children are known. At least that arbitrary rule provides an 
incentive for noncustodial parents to support and maintain 
contact with their children. It is indisputable that it is in 
the best interest of the children of divorce to have a continuing 
relationship with their noncustodial parent. And while no court 
can force a noncustodial parent to assume the responsibility 
which he or she should exercise toward the children, the court 
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should be extremely reluctant to block the reasonable efforts by 
a noncustodial parent to maintain some tie (even a nominal tie) 
with his or her children. 
II. The District Court Considered the Appropriate Factors in 
Determining What Surname Would Be in the Best Interests of the 
Children of These Parties. 
A. The Factors Considered by the District Court Have Been 
Identified by This Court and Courts in Other States as the 
Appropriate Factors in Determining the Best Interests of 
Children. 
The dispute in this case arose at the time of divorce. The 
divorcing woman wanted to resume using the surname of a former 
husband, to whom she had been married some time before her 
marriage to Mr. Jacobson and by whom she had one child who also 
bore the surname "Hamby." Mr. Jacobson did not object to his 
wife resuming the use of the surname "Hamby." However, she also 
wanted the two minor children which she and Mr. Jacobson had 
parented to bear the surname "Hamby." Mr. Jacobson objected to 
that, wanting them both to bear his surname, "Jacobson," after 
the divorce. 
In resolving this dispute between two parents regarding the 
names by which their infant children would be known after the 
divorce, the district court explicitly noted and considered nine 
factors: (1) the relationship between the father (noncustodial 
parent) and the children; (2) the relationship between the 
mother (custodial parent) and the children; (3) the degree of 
embarrassment or inconvenience the children would experience 
having a surname different from that used by their mother; (4) 
the very young age of the children and the length of time by 
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which they had been known by their surnames; (5) the fact that 
the surname selected by the mother for them was not a family 
(genealogical-biological family); (6) any embarrassment that 
would be associated with the use of the surname because of the 
bad reputation of it; (7) the stability of the identification 
which the respective surnames represented; (8) the implication 
of illegitimacy which might arise from the use by biological 
siblings of different surnames; and (9) the fact that the 
children when older may petition for a name change on their own. 
The district court obviously had given careful consideration 
to memoranda filed by the attorneys before making this decision. 
The factors relied upon the district court are very similar to 
the factors which the Utah Supreme Court identified in Hutchison 
v. Hutchison as relevant to the determination of the best 
interests of the child in custody disputes. There the court 
declared: 
Some factors the court may consider in determining the 
child's best interests relate primarily to the child's 
feelings or special needs: the preference of the child; 
keeping siblings together; the relative strength of the 
child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; 
and, in appropriate cases, the general interest in continuing 
previously determined custody arrangements where the child is 
happy and well adjusted. Other factors relate primarily to 
the prospective custodians' character or status or to their 
capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral 
character and emotional stability; duration and depth of 
desire for custody; ability to provide personal rather than 
surrogate care; significant impairment of ability to function 
as a parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other 
cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; 
religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, 
in extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and 
financial condition. (These factors are not necessarily 
listed in order of importance.) 
649 P.2d at 41. 
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The factors relied upon by the district court are also 
similar to those endorsed by other courts which have stated that 
disputes between divorcing parents concerning the surnames of 
their children are to be governed by the best interests of the 
child standard. For instance, the California Supreme Court 
declared: 
Under the test thus revised the length of time that the child 
has used a surname is to be considered. . . . If, as here, 
the time is negligible because the child is very young, other 
facts may be controlling. For instance, the effect of a name 
change on preservation of the father-child relationship, the 
strength of the mother-child relationship, and the 
identification of the child as part of a family unit are all 
pertinent. The symbolic role that a surname other than the 
natural father's may play in easing relations with a new 
family should be balanced against the importance of 
maintaining the biological father-child relationship. ff[T]he 
embarrassment or discomfort that a child may experience when 
he bears a surname different from the rest of his family" 
should be evaluated. . . . 
In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583. See also Cohee, 
317 N.W.2d at 384; Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 329-30; Annot. 92 
A.L.R. 3d at 192-93. 
The district court's concern for the impact of the choice of 
name upon the relationship between the child and the noncustodial 
father was particularly appropriate. In determining the best 
interests of a child 
courts look most frequently at the impact the change will 
have on the father-child relationship. The starting point 
for this analysis is the assumption that ff[s]ociety has a 
strong interest in the preservation of the parental 
relationship. Even though a divorce decree may terminate a 
marriage, courts have traditionally tried to maintain and to 
encourage continuing parental relationships." The courts' 
concern is with the effect a name change will have on that 
fragile relationship. 
It has been recognized that change of a child's paternal 
surname may foster an unnatural barrier between father 
and child and erode a relationship that should be 
nurtured. . . . Where the parents of a child are 
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divorced and his mother has his custody, the bond 
between father and child is tenuous at best, and that 
bond may be weakened if not destroyed by a change of the 
minor's name, . . . It has been said that such a change 
would lend aid to estrangement of father and child, 
contrary to the best interest of the child, and 
constitute a step toward complete severance of the 
father-child relationship. . . . 
. . . [A decree changing a child's name] approaches, 
even though it does not reach, the permanent deprivation 
attendant upon adoption. But the step from change of 
surname, in view of its erosive effect on the parental 
and filial relationship, may be a short one. Erosion 
may be destructive, not just damaging. 
Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325, quoting Carroll v. Johnson, 565 
S.W.2d 10, 14-15 (Ark. 1978); Accord, West v. Wright, 283 A.2d 
401 (Md. 1971); Robinson v. Hansel, 223 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. 1974). 
"It . . . has been generally recognized that the interests of 
the [noncustodial] parent . . . in maintaining a parental bond 
with the child is entitled to significant consideration . . . ." 
Annot. 92 A.L.R. 3d at 1095. See also ^d. at 1106. Many courts 
have specifically noted this factor as a significant 
consideration in their analysis of the best interests of the 
child in change of name conflicts. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 
Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583; In re Marriage of Omelson, 445 N.E.2d 
951 (111. App. 1983); Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. App. 
1979); Firman v. Firman, 610 P.2d at 178; In re Newcomb, 472 
N.E.2d 1142 (Ohio App. 1984); Ex Parte Stull, 280 S.E.2d 209 
(S.C. 1981); Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Ct. App. Tex. 
1984). The evidence in the record shows that Mr. Jacobson wanted 
his children to bear his name; that the parties made an agreement 
to that effect, and that he has consistently opposed the attempt 
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by his ex-wife to call the children by the surname of her prior 
husband, Hamby. It also reflects that, despite the economic 
frustrations of being an unemployed miner, he has done his best 
to provide child support, and at the time of the divorce hearing 
had paid back the state of Utah for all the sums it has provided 
for his children and wife. 
The district court appropriately considered the effect which 
the surname of the children would have upon their relationship 
with their custodial mother. Utah courts have a profound 
"commitment to stability and security and a child's custodial 
placement." Becker, 694 P.2d at 611. However, it is worth 
noting that courts have not emphasized this factor unduly 
"because mothers, usually given custodial preference in the past, 
generally had more regular contact and could maintain a 
psychological relationship [with the children] without the need 
for the tie a surname provides." In re Marriage of Schiffman, 
620 P.2d at 584. Nevertheless, it is a significant factor, and 
Judge Harding appropriately took it into consideration in 
determining the surname by which the children would be known 
after the divorce of their parents in this case. 
The silence of the record on this point, however, is 
deafening. There is absolutely no evidence that the mother-child 
relationship would be harmed in any respect. And that was the 
conclusion reached by the court. The mother had a child by a 
previous marriage who went by the surname "Hamby." During the 
marriage of the parties, the mother went by the surname 
"Jacobson." Thus, during the time she was married to Mr. 
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Jacobson and lived with him, the mother had a different surname 
than her oldest child. There is no hint in the record that that 
caused any harm to their relationship. Moreover, the school 
psychologist who testified, who was aware of the situation of the 
parties, did not indicate that he was aware of any facts or 
circumstances that would give rise to the suggestion that the 
relationship between Ms. Hamby and her children would be harmed 
if the children bore a surname different than the one she chose 
to go by. (R. at 144-49, Tr. 24-29.) 
The misconduct of the noncustodial parent which might cause 
the children to suffer the shame of "guilt by association" is a 
valid factor to consider in determining the surname by which the 
children should be known after divorce. Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. 
at 330. In re Newcomb, 472 N.E.2d 1145. But, "[t]he misconduct 
an ex-husband must engage in to forfeit his naming rights must be 
heinous." MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 139. Thus, murder, In 
re Christjohn, 428 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. 1981), or incest and 
incarceration, W.V.H., 246 A.2d 501 (N.J. Super. 1968) are the 
types of conduct which could cause the children such great 
embarrassment as to rule out the use of noncustodial father's 
surname. But the court will not reach that conclusion lightly, 
or on the basis unilateral allegations of one divorcing parent 
who is angry at the other. "In In re Christjohn . . . the trial 
court took extensive psychological testimony as to the damage the 
murder did to the child." MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 139, n. 
187. 
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In this case, the mother testified that the father of the 
children "had a reputation as a drinker and a fighter" (R. 133, 
Tr. 13) and she further alleged (without any corroboration) that 
he had physically injured the child. However, counsel for Mr, 
Jacobson proffered evidence that "his conduct is not such as 
would in any way be so unreasonable or outlandish that it would 
require the Court in the interest of the children to take his 
name from them." (R. ; 2d Tr. 5.) He further offered to 
introduce evidence that the mother's "character and behavior is 
negative." (Ij3. ) Thus, this factor was not decisive. 
The importance of the surname of the children to identify 
them with their extended genealogical and biological family is a 
relevant consideration. "[C]ourts occasionally mention the 
desirability of a child maintaining his paternal surname so that 
he may know his parentage." Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325. See 
also In re Presson, 451 N.E.2d at 970 (only son and only grandson 
on father's side). See also Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d at 63. 
In this case, the name "Jacobson" links the children with one 
of the two families from which they are descended, and of which 
they are a part. Jacobson is the genealogical and biological 
paternal family. On the other hand, "Hamby" links the children 
with the family that is not a part of their biological or 
genealogical heritage. It is the name of a former husband of 
their mother. There was absolutely no evidence presented why it 
would be in the best interests of the children to take the name 
of their mother's former husband at the cost of losing any 
identity-connection with both of the genealogical-biological 
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families of which they are a part. The isolation and 
abandonment, the symbolic withdrawal from extended family, is not 
to be discounted. 
The court properly considered the age of the children and the 
length of time they had been known by their surnames. Certainly 
continuity is an important factor in assessing the best interests 
of very young children. Hogge, 649 P.2d at 51; Becker, 694 P.2d 
at 608. The length of time a child has used a surname is a 
factor that other courts and commentators have noted. Note, 1979 
Utah L. Rev. at 326, 327; MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 131; In 
re Marriage Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583 ("If, as here, the time is 
negligible because the child is very young, other factors may be 
controlling."); Cohee, 317 N.W.2d at 381. 
In this case, the oldest child was less than 2 1/2 years old 
at the time Judge Harding conducted the hearing on the cross 
petitions for name change. At the time of birth out of wedlock, 
the child had been given the name Hamby, the name his mother was 
then using. Mr. Jacobson's counsel offered to present evidence 
that during the marriage the child had been known by the surname 
his mother used during the marriage, Jacobson. (R. ; 2d Tr. 
5.) (Plaintiff would dispute that fact. _Id. ) The youngest 
child was less than six months old at the time of the hearing. 
At birth he had been given the surname Jacobson. Since it is 
undisputed that the mother assumed the surname Jacobson during 
her marriage to Mr. Jacobson, it is very likely that their oldest 
child, an infant, was also known by the surname Jacobson. But, 
in any event, both children were so young that it is unlikely 
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that either of them had any personal identification with the 
surname that they were given. Nor is it likely that their 
friends identified them with that surname. Thus, at the time the 
district court entered its order on the cross petitions for 
change of name, the age and length of time factors were 
negligible. 
Another factor which it was appropriate for the court to 
consider was the degree of embarrassment or inconvenience which 
the children would incur from having surnames that were 
inconsistent from their mother's or other members of their own 
family. In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583; Cohee, 317 
N.W.2d at 384. 
Another factor the courts examine is the embarrassment, 
confusion, and inconvenience a child may experience among his 
peers because he bears a different surname than the rest of 
his new family. This situation most commonly arises after a 
child's parents divorce and his mother, the custodial parent, 
remarries. The courts, however, almost uniformly recite the 
litany 'minor embarrassment or emotional upset [is] not 
sufficient to require that a change of name be granted' and 
minimize the severity of the problem by pointing out that the 
situation has become relatively common in a society where 
divorce and subsequent remarriage are so prevalent. 
Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325-26. See also Annot., 92 A.L.R. 3d 
at 1100; MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 148. Thus, most courts 
have considered this factor, but have concluded that it is not 
controlling in the absence of evidence of extraordinary 
embarrassment, confusion or problem. See generally, Laks, 540 
P.2d at 1278; West v. Wright, 283 A.2d at 404; Young, 356 N.W.2d 
at 823; Robinson, 223 N.W.2d at 141; In re Newcomb, 472 N.E.2d at 
1142; Brown, 683 S.W.2d at 61; Flowers v. King, 237 S.E.2d 111, 
114 (Va. 1977). 
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In this case there was no evidence of any exceptional 
circumstances. There was no evidence that there had been any 
problem, embarrassment, confusion or inconvenience for the 10 
year old child of Mrs, Jacobson by her earlier marriage, named 
"Hamby," while that child belonged to the "Jacobson11 family and 
had a surname different from his mother, stepfather, and half 
brother. Moreover, Ms. Hamby has been known by three different 
names during the past years. She has been married twice, and 
each time assumed the surname of her husband upon marriage. If 
she should marry a third time, there is no reason to believe that 
she would not assume the surname of her third husband upon 
marriage. The inconvenience to the children of having a 
different surname than their half-brother and mother might not be 
as great as the embarassment of having a different surname than 
either their father or mother, should Ms. Hamby remarry. 
Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303, 307 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1985). It was appropriate for the district court to note 
the potential instability of surname that would be created if it 
acceeded to the Appellant's request that the children of Mr. 
Jacobson should be given the surname "Hamby." 
It was also appropriate for the court to consider the 
significance of two children who were full brothers to one 
another, born of the same mother and father, having different 
surnames from each other. "We have also expressed a preference 
to keep siblings together." Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 
254, 256 (Utah 1985); Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41; Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979). In this case, both the 
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mother and the father want their two children to bear the same 
name as each other. The only disagreement is to which name that 
shall be. 
It was appropriate for the district court to be concerned 
about the stigma or embarrassment associated with illegitimacy 
which the children might experience. Because of the unique 
circumstances associated with the religious practice of polygamy 
by the early settlers of the territory, Utah has been the leading 
jurisdiction in the United States to extend legal compassion and 
concern for the welfare of "illegitimate" children. (In Cope v. 
Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891) the United States Supreme Court upheld 
the Utah Territorial law giving illegitimate children the right 
to inherit from their fathers, noting: "While this statute is an 
innovation upon the common law, and in some particulars a novelty 
in legislation, we perceive no objection to its validity." (137 
U.S. at 684.) U.C.A. § 78-30-12 today explicitly provides that 
an illegitimate child may be adopted (legitimated) by its 
biological father "by publicly acknowledging it as his own, 
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is 
married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were 
a legitimate child. . . . " And the most well-established method 
of "acknowledging" an illegitimate child is for the father to 
give the child his name. See generally Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d 
898 (Utah 1979); State Ex Rel Baby Girl M., 476 P.2d 1013 (Utah 
1970); Rohwer v. District Court, 125 P.2d 671 (Utah 1912); See 
also Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647 (1980). In the Guidelines for 
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Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on Birth 
Certificate (revised Oct. 5, 1981) the Bureau of Health 
Statistics, Utah Department of Health notes: "The parents should 
be advised that by giving the child a different surname than that 
of the father, the birth certificate may appear to some persons 
as a birth which occurred out of wedlock." Thus, it was entirely 
appropriate for the district court to take this factor into 
account. 
The district court properly considered the ability of the 
children to change their own names when they become mature. 
"Under the common law a person can change his surname without any 
formal legal proceeding, so long as his purpose is not fraudulent 
and the change does not infringe upon another's rights. All 
states, however, provide a statutory method for effecting a 
change of name. . . Most jurisdictions [interpret] the statutory 
procedure as being supplemental to, and not supplanting the 
common law." Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 316, 317. See also 
MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 104. This factor has been 
considered by other courts in resolving disputes between parents 
regarding the surnames of their children. Firman, 610 P.2d at 
181; Brown, 683 S.W.2d at 61; In re Newcomb, 472 N.E.2d at 1142; 
In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 302. 
Utah has a change of name statute which provides a clear and 
easily accessible procedure for change of name. U.C.A. § 42-1-1, 
2, 3. Since the children in this case were both under the age of 
three, it was both prudent and appropriate for the district court 
to take into account the fact that they would have the 
opportunity (undoubtedly heavily influenced by their custodial 
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mother) when they reached an age of discretion to initiate a 
proceeding to change their surname if they wanted to do so. 
it should be noted also that both parties in this case 
expressly agreed that the children should bear the surname of Mr. 
Jacobson. (R. 31, 32, 40, 41, Tr. 11, 12, 20, 21; R. ; 2d Tr. 
3.) Unilateral action of a custodial mother to change the 
surname of a child in derogation of an agreement ought not to be 
endorsed by the court. Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.2d 
356 (App. Div. 1985). 
B. The District Court Properly Did Not Employ Any Gender-
based Presumption in Resolving the Dispute Concerning the Surname 
of the Children of These Divorcing Parents. 
Judge Harding did not in any way rely upon any gender-based 
presumption in resolving the dispute between these parents 
concerning the surname their children should bear. Neither his 
Ruling nor his Order, nor the transcript of the hearing he held, 
contains any hint or shadow of sex-bias. 
The gender-neutral approach taken by the district court below 
is exceptionally astute and progressive. By contrast, the 
highest courts in at least 15 jurisdictions, and appellate courts 
in another 14 states "have accepted the standard that the father 
has a 'primary' and a 'protectable' 'natural' or 'time-honored' 
right superior to that of the mother to name his children." 
MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 137. See also Annot. 92 A.L.R. 3d 
at 1105-06; Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 323, 328. 
The more enlightened, rational approach is that neither 
parent has a superior right to name the child. See, e.g., In re 
Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583; Cohee, 317 N.W.2d at 383; In re 
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Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 300; Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d at 304. See also 
Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev- at 309-11, 15, 32-33, Although equal 
protection challenges on the paternal surname custom have been 
notably unsuccessful, MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 157, as a 
matter of policy (wholly apart from constitutional law) a gender-
based rule of parental preference in determining surnames of 
children would provoke controversy not only in society, but would 
encourage litigation among hostile divorcing parents. 
Ironically, it is the Appellant, Kathleen Hamby, who is 
urging the court to adopt a sex-based rule, or a thinly-disguised 
gender preference. Appellant's counsel contends for "the right 
of women to name their children." MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. 91. 
That would violate equal protection because it would constitute 
direct gender discrimination. Note, Utah L. Rev. at 315. 
The Appellant's assertion that custodial parents should be 
given the right, or presumed right, to choose the surname of 
their children is a thinly-disguised attempt at gender 
discrimination. It is a well-known fact that approximately 90 
percent of all children living with just one parent are living 
with their mothers. Bureau of Census, Current Population Report, 
Population Characteristics Services, P-20, No. 380, Marital 
Status and Living Arrangements, March, 1982, at 4 (1983). A 
legal preference for custodial mothers would smell just as much 
of sex discrimination as a legal presumption in favor of 
noncustodial fathers. 
The enlightened approach followed by Judge Harding, who 
declined to adopt or apply a male or female favoring rule or 
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presumtpion, should be commended and endorsed by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Indeed, this court should say, as the Montana Supreme 
Court recently did: "The District Court's findings and 
conclusions state nothing to the effect that husband has any 
preference or natural right to have his [children] bear his 
surname. The child's best interests does not involve the 
equality of the sexes. The findings and conclusions stress the 
best interests of the child. Therefore we find the Appellant's 
argument without merit." Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089, 1091 
(Mont. 1983). 
C. This Court Should Not Substitute the Feminist 
Perspective for the Best Interests of the Child. 
Kathleen Hamby and her counsel in this case have missed the 
crucial issue. The issue in this case is not as Appellant's 
counsel suggests, a matter of "The Right of Women to Name Their 
Children." MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. 91. As noted above, that 
"right" arguably violates the 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and the Utah Constitution, as a rule of blatant sex 
discrimination. 
Determining the surname of children is not to be decided as a 
matter of the mere extension of the rights of the adult parents. 
The court is not merely an umpire awarding a prize to one of two 
competing adults. Children are not mere chattels to be possessed 
by custodial mothers or abandoned by disinterested, noncustodial 
fathers. 
The record reveals a punitive motive on the part of 
Appellant, Kathleen Hamby. She testified: "Mr. Jacobson has put 
me in a position now to raise three children by myself, because 
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it's his choice not to be a husband that I can stay with. (R. 
131, 32; Tr. 11, 12.) (Ironically, while she blames Mr. Jacobson 
for not being "a husband that I can stay with" it was Kathleen 
Jacobson who filed the suit for divorce, not Mr. Gail Jacobson.) 
She also expressed her opposition to Mr. Jacobson having any 
association with the children at all after the divorce. (R. 139, 
140; Tr. 19, 20.) (But see Ed. at 140, 141; Tr. 20, 21: "as the 
children get older, if they make the decision that they want 
their father's name, if he has been coming around and seeing them 
and being a father to them . . . .") She also blamed her husband 
for a physical injury which the oldest infant has. (R. 138; Tr. 
8.) And she was very anxious to have the divorce entered 
immediately, without any waiting period ("I'm begging the court 
to make the divorce final today so that I can have this baby. 
I've suffered this pregnancy the whole time facing this divorce. 
. . ." R. 136; Tr. 16.) 
The demeanor of Mrs. Jacobson when she appeared before the 
court at both hearings, is not captured by the record. But if 
her demeanor matched her words, she demonstrated substantial 
hostility toward the father of the children, her ex-husband. The 
name she wanted to give the two children of Mr. Jacobson was the 
surname of her former husband (against whom Mr. Jacobson compared 
during his marriage to the Appellant). It is also noteworthy 
that when she divorced her former husband, she did not insist 
upon changing the name of the child they had, whose custody was 
awarded to her. Since the surname by which a child should be 
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known after his parents divorce ought not to be resolved on the 
basis of spite, punishment, or animosity, the attitude and 
statements of the Appellant detract from the weight and 
credibility of her contention that the children should bear the 
surname of her former husband, "Hamby." 
Most of the cases involving a conflict between parents over 
the surname of their children arise "after a child's parents 
divorce and his mother, the custodial parent, remarries," Note, 
1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325, In this case, the controversy does not 
arise upon remarriage, when the children arguably have been 
integrated into a new family and another father-figure has 
replaced their natural father. The controversy arises because 
the custodial mother wants to terminate and cut-off all ties 
which the noncustodial father has with his children. 
If the sole question were the best interests of Kathleen 
Hamby, she might arguably persuade the court that the children 
should bear her surname because she would be happier, avenged or 
so forth. But that is not the question the district court asked, 
nor is it the question that this Supreme Court should consider. 
Rather, the focus is on the best interests of the child. And 
that was the sole principle followed, and the controlling 
principle applied, by the district court below. 
Ill. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Ordering the Children of These Divorcing Parents to Take the 
Surname "Jacobson." 
A. The District Court Had Jurisdiction to Determine in a 
Divorce Proceeding the Surname by Which the Children of the 
Divorcing Parents Would be Known After the Divorce. 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5 provides that the district court may enter 
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such orders in relation to the children . . . as may be 
equitable" at the time the district court entered the divorce 
decree. (At the time the District Court heard the subsequent 
cross petitions regarding change of name this statute had been 
amended, but this language remained unchanged. See also U.C.A. 
§ 30-3-10 ("The court shall make such order for the future care 
and custody of the minor children as it may deem just and 
proper."). U.C.A. § 30-3-5 has been very liberally construed, 
and grants continuing jurisdiction to the court. See Karren v. 
State Dept. of Social Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986); Dehm v. 
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976). Other courts, likewise, have 
held that it is proper for a court on divorce to retain 
jurisdiction to later resolve a dispute regarding the surnames of 
the children of the divorcing parties. Lassiter-Geers v. 
Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303, 305 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
The Appellant urges the court to hold that the lower court 
had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute regarding the names of 
the children. Respondent agrees that the district court had 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the lower court has never been 
contested by anyone. There is no jurisdictional issue for the 
Supreme Court of Utah to decide. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Entering Its Order in This Case. 
Application of the best interests of the child standard in 
any case regarding the welfare of children is most appropriate 
for the trial court. As this court recently stated concerning 
application of the best interest of the child standard in custody 
disputes: "Assessments of the applicability and relative weight 
of the various factors in a particular case lie within the 
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discretion of the trial court, 'Only where trial court action is 
so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abusive discretion 
should the Appellant forum interpose its own judgment.'" 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41. See also Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 599 
P.2d 510, 12 (Utah 1979); Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
1982); Christensen v. Christensen, 528 P.2d 1297 (1981). 
Likewise, the court has declared: "In reviewing child custody 
and support proceedings, we accord substantial deference to the 
trial court's findings and give it considerable latitude in 
fashioning appropriate relief. We will not disturb that court's 
acts unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary 
where there has been an abusive discretion." Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). And this is the standard 
generally applied in other states when an appeal is brought from 
a decision resolving a dispute between parents regarding the 
surname of a child. See, e.g., Flowers, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Va. 
1977); In re Marriage of Presson, 451 N.E.2d 971, 72 (L. App. 
1983) ("The standard applied in cases involving a minor child's 
change of surname is whether, considering the welfare of the 
child, the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at its 
decision."). 
The issue arose below on cross petitions incidental to the 
divorce decree. Kathleen Jacobson failed to offer sufficient 
evidence to persuade the court that it would be in the best 
interests of her children that they should bear the surname of 
her prior husband, who was not the father of the children. 
Before Judge Harding, both counsels stipulated to proceed on 
profers of evidence. (R. 102, 71, ; 2d Tr. 2). 
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The procedural approach followed by the lower court was 
excellent. At the time the divorce hearing came before Judge 
Bullock, the only remaining disagreement between the parties was 
what the children's surnames would be, Mrs. Jacobson was anxious 
to have the divorce become effective immediately, and Mr. 
Jacobson was willing to accede to that wish. The court entered 
its order granting the divorce but preserving the status quo 
regarding the names of the two minor children. That gave the 
parties an opportunity to work out their disagreement. If they 
could not, the court retained jurisdiction to resolve the issue 
after Mrs. Jacobson delivered her child. After the birth of the 
child, both parties filed petitions regarding the change of 
names. At the hearing, the parties stipulated to introduce 
profers of evidence. The court then, without ruling, asked for 
briefs on the legal question. After those briefs were submitted 
and the court carefully considered them, the District Court 
entered its ruling applying the "best interests of the child" 
standard and specifying numerous significant factors which it 
took into account in this particular case. The court promptly 
entered its Order that the children should bear the surname 
"Jacobson." 
The district court found that there was no dispute as to any 
material facts. In this court, there does not appear to be any 
dispute as to the facts either. Appellant Kathleen Hamby failed 
to introduce sufficient evidence to justify the unorthodox, 
disruptive and potentially punitive selection of surnames upon 
which she was insisting. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court applied the correct legal standard to 
resolve the controversy between two divorcing parents concerning 
the surname which their two infant children would take after the 
divorce by focusing on the best interests of the children. The 
district court properly rejected the appellant's contention that 
the custodial parent has the right or presumptive right 
unilaterally to choose the surname by which the two infant 
children fathered by the man she is divorcing shall be known 
after the divorce, over the objection of the father. 
The district court properly rejected appellant's contention 
that the two infant children should bear the surname of one of 
her previous husbands, who was not the father of the children, 
even though appellant herself chose to be called by that surname 
after the divorce. The district court's determination that the 
children should bear the surname of their father, who desired the 
children to bear his surname, and who was awarded visitation 
rights, was correct inasmuch as the court properly determined 
that it would strengthen the relationship between the children 
and their noncustodial father, would not harm the relationship 
between the children and their custodial mother, and would not 
embarrass or humiliate the children to carry the surname of their 
father because of any alleged bad reputation, would not cause 
undue inconvenience to them, and would preserve their ties with 
at least one of their biological-genealogical families. 
Therefore, Respondent Gail Jacobson respectfully requests the 
Utah Supreme Court to affirm the order of the district court to 
award Respondent costs, and attorneys fees. 
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Respectfully submitted this / / day of July, 1986. 
•%it 
Lynn D. Wardle 
Co-counsel for Respondent 
f^JJ^JL^ °T\A 
Richard M. Taylor 
Co-counsel for Respondeat 
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day of July, 1986, to counsel for Appellant: to Priscilla Ruth 
MacDougall, 346 Kent Lane, Madison, WI 53713 (2 copies), and to 
Mary C. Corporon and Kellie F. Williams, Corporon & Williams, 
1100 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 (2 copies).Co-
counsel for Respondent, Lynn D. Wardle, 1976 N. 85 W.^ j^Orem, UT 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order of District Court, March 10, 1986, in Jacobson v. 
Jacobson Al 
2. Ruling of District Court, Feb. 21, 1986, in Jacobson v. 
Jacobson A3 
3. Transcript of Proceedings, Oct. 24, 1986, in Jacobson v, 
Jacobson A5 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
6 || STATE OF UTAH 
7 H 
" KATHLEEN JACOBSON, 
8 || AND THE STATE OF UTAH 
by and through Utah State 
9II Dept. of Social Services, 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
12 || GAIL JACOBSON, 
13|| Defendant. Civil No. 67,957 
This matter came on for hearing October 24, 1985 before 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding upon plaintiff's petition to change 
the surname of Kevin Jacobson to Kevin Hamby and upon defendant's 
petition to change the surname of Kelly Hamby to Kelly Jacobson. 
The Court heard profers of testimony from plaintiff and 
defendant and counsel for the parties stipulated that the Court 
may consider the petitions before it upon such profers and upor 
memoranda to be filed. The parties filed the memoranda and th< 
Court having considered the same it is therefore 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as foLlows: 
1. Kevin D. Jacobson born April 13, 1984 shal 
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continue to bear the surname of defendant Gail Jacobson. 
2. Kelly Hamby born June 14, 1983 shall bear the 
surname of Jacobson and shal^ l be known as Kelly Jacobson. 
DATED thJ . 
BY THE^GOURT: 
m ana snail De Known as n^ eiiy jac< 
lis o f / ^ S f e K ^ , 1986. 
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CERTIFICATE CfF MAILING 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to Mr. Donald E. Elkins, Attorney at Law, 60 East 
100 South No. 200, Provo, UT 84601, postage prepaid on the 28th 
day of February, 1986. 
Secretary 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
KATHLEEN JACOBSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GAIL JACOBSON, 
Defendant. 
Case Number 67957 
RULING 
******** 
Having considered the memoranda and argument of the 
parties, and having taken the matter under advisement, the court 
hereby grants defendant's petition and denies plaintiff's 
petition. The court finds that it is in the best interest of the 
parties minor children, Kelly Lynn & Kevin D., to be known by the 
surname Jacobson. 
The court bases this ruling on the following reasons: 
1) the father-child relationship will be strengthened by the 
children bearing the name Jacobson while not harming the mother-
child relationship, 2) i:here is no embarrassment or inconvenience 
associated with an explanation of why their mother's surname is 
different since divorce is a common occurrence, 3) the children 
are too young to be accustomed to the surname Hamby, 4) Hamby is 
not the mother's maiden name, 5) there is no embarrassment 
because of defendant's alleged bad reputation, and 6) the 
children will always be identified with at least one natural 
parent by being known as Jacobson. 
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The court finds unpersuasive plaintiff's arguments that 
it would be beneficial for Kevin and Kelly to be known by Hamby 
as their mother and stepsister are. Were custody to change, 
Kevin and Kelly would be faced with the same situation plaintiff 
now seeks to avoid. Furthermore, were plaintiff to remarry Kevin 
and Kelly would again have a surname other than that of at least 
one of their custodial parents. Of paramount concern to the 
court is the fact that Kevin and Kelly should both bear the same 
name to avoid any implications of illegitimacy which might arise 
if asked why brothers of the same natural father have different 
last names. 
Finally, the court notes that the law provides that the 
children may petition for a name change if they so desire when 
they are old enough to make an intelligent decision. 
Defendant's counsel to prepare an appropriate order. 
DATED this ^ / ^ T day of Fefcfnl^f^ 1986, 
cc: Richard M. Taylor 
Donald E. Elkins 
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October 24, 1985 
UTAH COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
Provo, Utah 
ORIGINAL 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE. 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff DONALD E. ELKINS, ESQ. 
60 East 1UO South, Suite #200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
For the Defendant: RICHARD M. TAYLOR, ESQ. 
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P R O C E E D 
THE COURT: 
gentlemen. This is the time 
case of Jacobson v. Jacobson, 
The matter is before 
I N G S 
Good morning, 
set for the h 
Civil No. 67 
the Court on 
petition. The record may reflect that the 
1 conferred briefly with counsel in chambers 
ladies and 
earing in the 
,957. 
the plaintiff f s 
Court has 
prior to this 
proceeding and the Court feels the best way to proceed 
this morning would be by way of proffered statements of 
factual evidence_which, I believe^ is essentially 
undisputed and that the principal issue is a matter of 
law that will require briefs by counsel to be submitted 
and the Court make its determination based on those briefs. 
Mr. Elkins? 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor if the plaintiff, 
my client Mrs. Kathy Hamby, were to testify this morning 
she would testify the following facts: That Hamby, 
the name she goes by now, is the name from a prior 
marriage; that she has one older child who goes by that 
name Hamby. 
THE COURT: What is the age of the child? 
MR. ELKINS: Kathy, how old is your oldest 
child? 
THE PLAINTIFF: Eleven. 
u 
the records of the State of Utah. She would testify that 
both those things were done; that in fact: the middle 
child still maintains the-name of Hamby, while the third 
child when it was born did have the name of Jacxihson 
affixed to the birth certificate and that still remains 
so on the records of the State of Utah. She would further 
testify that she feels as a custodial parent it's her 
right to have the name of the children be as she desires 
so that at least all her family would have the same name. 
That will be one of the issues that we will be speaking 
about in the briefs submitted. She would further testify 
that she feels that Mr. Jacobson, due to prior action on 
his part, is^unfit to have his name attached to the child 
and that were it attached to the younger child or the 
second child that it might create problems for them which 
would not be in their best interests, and that she would 1 
finally testify that she thinks that having all of her 
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interests . 
Court 
facts 
with 1 
about 
• 
will 
and that that is what she would request of the 
THE COURT: 
MR. TAYLOR: 
Very well 
Briefly, 
essentially be the same as 
the exception that the 
four years old, isn't 
child — I 
it? 
then, 
Your H 
stated 
think 
Mr. Taylor? 
onor, our 
by 
the 
Mr. Elkins 
child is 
/17 
MR. ELKINS: He is eleven years old, 
Your Honor. 
She would further testify that she conceived 
another child with Mr. Jacobson, the defendant in this 
matter, prior to the time of their marriage; that when 
that child was born the name Hamby was given to him on 
his birth certificate. Since that time he's been known 
by the name of Hamby. She would testify that some time 
after her marriage to Mr. Jacobson they did enter into 
an agreement to change the second child's name from Hamby 
to Jacobson, but that as far as I can ascertain that was 
never followed through with on the records of the State 
of Utah as far as an actual change being made in the birth 
certificate. She would further testify that during the 
time of her marriage to Mr. Jacobson another child was 
conceived and that she brought a complaint for divorce 
against Mr. Jacobson prior to the birth of that last child; 
that she was granted a divorce in a hearing before Judge 
Bullock in this Court; that as part of the divorce decree 
the parties were told that the second child by the name 
of Hamby, who is the natural child of Mr. Jacobson, was 
instructed to maintain the name of Hamby, at least on a 
temporary basis, and that the new child that was to be 
born after the granting of the divorce was to have the 
name of Jacobson affixed to his or her birth certificate on 
3. 
1 (Discussion off the record.) 
2 The child is three years old, the oldest child. 
3 THE COURT: Two. 
4 MR,. TAYLOR: Only two. Then we have an 
5 infant. There are those two. The two year old did use 
6 the name and was known by the name of Jacobson during the 
1*: 
7 time the parties lived together as a married couple 
8 THE PLAINTIFF: That is not true. 
9 MR. TAYLOR: That is our answer. 
10 THE COURT: Well --
11 MR. TAYLOR: We also, of course, would 
12 dispute the legal conclusions as have been stated here 
13 and we would also have evidence that the defendant, while 
14 he wouldn't qualify for sainthood, nevertheless, his 
15 conduct is not such as would in any way be so unreasonable 
16 or outlandish that would require the Court in the interest 
17 of the children to take his name from them. Even if it 
18 were, even if his behavior were negative in some respects, 
19 likewise the applicant's character and behavior is 
20 I negative. We won't want to get into that, I think the 
21 I Court indicated, that would not be an issue. So we would 
22 submit it on that statement of our proffer that if he 
23 were called to make evidence that is what our evidence 
24 would be. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Very well. I 
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don't feel there is any material dispute as to the ij^ sues 
of fact in this case. However, as I indicated to counsel 
in chambers, it is a case in which I need your assistance 
in the law. I feel it is a legal issue and I would 
appreciate, Mr. Elkins, since it's your petition that you 
file a memorandum. I don't want to restrict you in the 
number of pages, Mr. Elkins, but I don't want a two hundred 
page brief. If you could limit it to ten or fifteen pages. 
I would allow you over the five pages prescribed by the 
rules. 
How long do you need to complete that memorandum? 
MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, I think I can 
have that prepared within fifteen days if that would be 
appropriate. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's have that 
submitted to the Court within fifteen days and a copy to 
Mr. Taylor. 
Mr. Taylor, how long would you like to have to 
respond? 
MR. TAYLOR: I would like at least fifteen 
days and also if the Court will allow me" that fifteen days 
I would like approval from the Court now that in the event 
that I need the extra time I can, by stipulation, obtain 
it from Mr. Elkins without asking. 
MR. ELKINS: We have no objection to that. 
A r 6 . 
r«-
We would like to have the matter fully presented to the 
Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Fifteen days then 
in which the defendant will have then to respond. If 
you need additional time you may have it upon stipulation 
of Mr. Elkins. 
MR. TAYLOR: I have several major matters 
in Federal Court that are coming up soon. I am a little 
concerned about my time. 
THE COURT: All right. That will be fine 
then. That will be the order, gentlemen. 
MR. ELKINS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Likewise, Mr. Taylor, I will 
not limit you in your length of response, although I would 
like not over, say, ten or fifteen pages. Let's keep it 
within reasonable bounds. 
Thank you. 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
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